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Abstract
Analysis of traffic logs of email received by
a large UK ISP shows considerable disparity
between the proportions of spam received by
addresses with different first characters. This
disparity is quite marked when only email ad-
dresses that appear to be ‘real’ are consid-
ered. The root cause is likely to be spam-
mers using ‘dictionary’ or ‘Rumpelstiltskin’
attacks to guess valid email addresses. There
is limited evidence for these attacks taking
place in real-time, suggesting that most ‘fake’
email addresses were constructed sometime
in the past and are now immortalised within
spammer databases.
1 Introduction
The recipients of unsolicited bulk email (spam) re-
port very differing experiences of how much spam they
each receive. Some of these differences are undoubt-
edly due to how visible individual email addresses
are, or how they are used [Hann 2006], and stud-
ies regularly find variations between different business
sectors [MessageLabs 2008]. In this paper, we con-
sider how some of the different perceptions may arise
from as simple an issue as which letter of the alpha-
bet an individual’s email address begins with; showing
that zebra@example.com receives a lower proportion
of spam than aardvark@example.com might expect to.
Having measured that the first letter of the local part
of an email address does indeed make a difference, we
then discuss why this occurs, and try to quantify some
spammer behaviour that might account for it.
2 Data collection
The dataset analysed in this paper is the incoming
email to Demon Internet, a United Kingdom ISP
with c 150 000 customers: a mix of individuals, and
small and medium-sized businesses. Demon sets the
MX records for generic customer sub-domains (e.g.:
example.demon.co.uk), as well as many specific cus-
tomer domains (e.g.: example.co.uk), to point at its
main email servers, and hence they handle the vast
majority of email arriving at the ISP. The exceptions
are larger companies (where MX records point at cus-
tomer machines) and intra-ISP email – Demon Inter-
net customers sending email to each other.
Traffic data (the date, time, source, destination and
size) of incoming email was collected for the eight week
period 1 February–27 March 2008. This period in-
cluded the Easter weekend (with two bank holidays).
Data from the same ISP for a four week period in 2007
was examined in [Clayton 2007].
On their incoming email servers, Demon Internet op-
erates a number of spam mitigation strategies – which
makes direct comparison with the 2007 data rather
problematic. For example, connections are refused
from sites which are listed in the SpamHaus Policy
Block List (PBL) [SpamHaus 2008a], viz: where the
responsible ISP has declared that machines in par-
ticular IP address blocks will only send email via
their own ‘smarthost’ machines, so that email which
arrives directly can reasonably be assumed to be
spam. Additionally, greylisting [Harris 2003] is ap-
plied to machines that appear in the SpamHaus ZEN
list [SpamHaus 2008b]. Any email that comes from
machines that are not on blocklists, or which is retried
after initial greylisting, will be passed through a spam
detection system provided by Cloudmark.
In this paper, the only email considered is that which
reaches the Cloudmark system. This will determine
whether the email appears to be spam and if so deliv-
ery will be refused. If the email is not categorised as
spam then it will be placed into customer mailboxes.
A small proportion of customers completely opt out
of the Cloudmark system; all of their email will be
considered ‘non-spam’, whatever its actual nature.
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Figure 1: Spam (red) and non-spam (green) email for
8 week period, where local parts begin with particular
letters. Line shows percentage of email that is spam.
Some email arrived with multiple destination ad-
dresses at Demon Internet customers. Except where
otherwise indicated, an email which is to be delivered
to n different Demon customers is counted as if it were
n different emails. Additionally, since we expect such
emails to be mainly ‘backscatter’, for the purposes of
the present paper we ignore email that appears to be
a ‘bounce’. This was done by the inexact expedient of
failing to count any email to a single destination that
has a null sender (< >).
Overall, for the eight week period considered and using
the above definitions, 550 596 270 emails arrived (8.94
million/day), of which 56.0% were deemed to be spam
and delivery was refused.
3 The first letter of local parts
We examined the first character of the local part of
the destination email addresses, ignoring the 321 730
(0.06%) emails where this did not begin with a letter
or digit. For each starting character (combining upper
and lower case), the number of spam and non-spam
emails was counted, and the results plotted in Figure 1.
As can be seen, ‘zebras’ (people with email addresses
beginning with a ‘z’) collectively do not receive very
much email, but their perception is that 74.3% of all
email is spam. In comparison, ‘aardvarks’ (people with
email addresses beginning with the letter ‘a’) have the
perception that 50.2% of all email is spam.
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Figure 2: Proportion of email that is spam for ‘real’
email addresses beginning with ‘a’ (red line) or ‘z’
(green line). The x-axis is the number of non-spam
emails that must be received for the address to be con-
sidered ‘real’.
However, the situation changes when we consider ‘real’
email addresses, which are likely to be reach an indi-
vidual’s mailbox. We take all of the email addresses
that begin with ‘a’ and ‘z’ and count, for each address
individually, how many emails they receive that are
spam or non-spam. We deem an email address to be
‘real’ if it receives at least n non-spam emails during
the eight week period we are considering.
Because the spam detection system is not perfect, it is
unlikely that detecting a single non-spam email will be
a good indicator of whether an email address is ‘real’.
Varying the value of n, the cut-off point for ‘realness’,
gives the results shown in Figure 2.
Clearly we would always expect some diminution in
spam percentage as the amount of non-spam email is
required to be higher – but what is most striking about
the results is that an individual ‘real zebra’, on aver-
age, will find that less than 20% of their email is spam,
whereas a particular ‘real aardvark’, on average, will
detect that over 30% of their email is spam.
It can be seen that a reasonably steady-state is reached
at around 28 non-spam emails. In other words, it is
plausible to define a ‘real’ address as one which, on av-
erage, receives one non-spam email every second day.
Using this criterion, the customers whose 62 784 ‘real’
email addresses start with ‘a’ perceive 35.2% of all
email to be spam. The equivalent figures for the num-
ber of ‘real’ addresses and the amount of email these
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Figure 3: Relationship between number of email ad-
dresses receiving 28 or more non-spam emails over
8 weeks, and the proportion of email these addresses
receive that is spam.
customers perceive to be spam are shown in Figure 3.
The scatter plot shows that as the number of ‘real’
addresses per letter increases, the proportion of spam
increases; though there are a lot of outlying points.
Some outliers can be easily explained (addresses start-
ing with ‘3d’ have been incompetently harvested from
HTML pages); others deserve further investigation.
Taking a much more cautious approach to what is a
‘real’ email address and requiring that over 8 weeks the
address receives 500 or more non-spam emails gives the
very similar relationship shown in Figure 4.
4 Spammers and spam lists
One reason for the behaviour that we have just mea-
sured is the way that spammers create and use lists
of email addresses. Initially they collected valid ad-
dresses by consulting mailing list archives, scanning
Usenet feeds, ‘scraping’ websites and so on. Systems
that would once have permitted these addresses to be
validated (delivery failures, the SMTP VRFY com-
mand etc.) are generally disabled nowadays – because
other spammers were guessing addresses and using
these ‘oracles’ to validate their guesses.
At some point, it occurred to the spammers that if
john@example.com was a valid email address then per-
haps john@another.com was valid as well, so they
started to combine local parts (to the left of the @) with
other domain names. This method of creating email
012
3
456
7
89
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
jk
l
m
no
p
q
r
s
t
u
v
w
xy
z
number of ‘real’ addresses
%
ag
e 
sp
am
0 2000 4000 6000 8000
0
10
20
30
40
50
Figure 4: Relationship between number of email ad-
dresses receiving 500 or more non-spam emails over
8 weeks, and the proportion of email these addresses
receive that is spam.
addresses to attempt delivery to is called a dictionary
attack (or sometimes a Rumpelstiltskin attack).
It ought to be possible to estimate the extent to which
spammers are using lists and the extent to which they
are doing the Rumpelstiltskin attack in real time, by
examining runs of deliveries to the email servers.
If the spam sender is using a sorted list of email
addresses – of whatever quality (possibly including
Rumpelstiltskin names, possibly not) then we would
expect to see incoming email addresses appearing in
order. Of course the spammer may not be sorting their
list, but many spammers will wish to weed out dupli-
cates, and sorting is normally a prerequisite for this.
For each sending IP address we examine the destina-
tion of each email. Difficulties with the logging of mul-
tiple destinations email forces us to ignore this type of
email in this part of the paper. This means that we
are only considering 276 million emails rather than the
full 300 million pieces of spam.
For each of the incoming email servers in turn, we
count runs of ascending (and also descending) ad-
dresses using normal case-sensitive alphabetical order-
ing rules. Since we are only interested in spam senders
(many senders of genuine email will also have ordered
lists) we ignore any run where less than half of the
emails were detected to be spam, and we also ignored
any run whose length was less than five.
Besides considering runs where the full address is in
length of run
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Figure 5: Email that is runs of spam in ascending (4)
or descending (5) alphabetical order of email addresses.
The red/green pair match only local parts, the blue/black
pair is where the run is within a single domain. Note that
both axes are logarithmic.
order, we also consider where the local parts are or-
dered, but the domain varies.
The rather disappointing results are shown in Figure 5
(note that both axes are logarithmic). The unexpected
result is that all of these runs put together only ac-
count for about 2.9% of all spam, so drawing con-
clusions from them is problematic. It is noteworthy
that ascending runs considerably outnumber descend-
ing runs, and that ignoring the domain makes runs
more common, but little else can be gleaned. Since
ordered lists appear very commonly when outgoing
email spam is detected using the methods outlined
in [Clayton 2004], the most likely reason for failing
to detect them in this data is the generic anti-spam
defences using the PBL and ZEN lists. Additionally,
many sources sent very low numbers of emails – the
likelihood being that Demon Internet received a very
small fraction of all the email they sent, so that picking
out patterns was never going to be likely.
5 Conclusions
Measuring incoming email has shown that the first let-
ter of email addresses makes a difference to the pro-
portion of incoming spam. As a group, ‘zebras’ receive
a higher proportion of spam than ‘aardvarks’. How-
ever, when considering ‘zebras’ that actually exist (in
that they receive non-spam email), they receive a lower
proportion of spam than actual ‘aardvarks’.
The effect may be attributed to Rumpelstiltskin at-
tacks, but there is limited evidence of incoming email
being alphabetically sorted by recipient – suggesting
that these attacks are not especially common at the
present time.
Turning the results around – there are some hints here
about viable anti-spam policies. Although classifying
email addresses by the amount of non-spam email re-
ceived is not a very sensible way of deciding whether
future messages will be spam or not, it does seem clear
that there is a significant gain in spam filtering effi-
ciency to be gained from making the ISP email recep-
tion systems aware of all valid email addresses.1 This
data indicates that around half of all the email which
is being given to the Demon Internet spam detection
system is destined for non-existent mailboxes.
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1Although some ISPs give customers a small number of
email addresses (example1@aol.com, example2@aol.com,
etc.) Demon Internet, in common with many other
business-oriented ISPs, provides email services for en-
tire domains (anything@example.co.uk) or subdomains
(anything@example.demon.co.uk). In consequence, the
email systems are not de facto aware of which email ad-
dresses might be valid.
